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Abstract 
 
This article discusses the Israeli strategy of addressing the issue of negotiation with the 
Palestinians during Netanyahu government 2009-2011. Netanyahu-Liebermann coalition 
government came after the defeat of the previous Israeli government led by Kadima political 
party under the chairmanship of Yahud Olmert in 2009 general election. That paved the way for 
the rise of the political forces that were leaning towards the Right within the Israeli political 
spectrum. The current Netanyahu government believes in stage-wise solution that divides the 
settlement with the Palestinians into two stages: the interim arrangement and the permanent 
solution. In order to hinder the Palestinian political endeavours under Abbas-Fayyad umbrella of 
internationalization of the conflict, Netanyahu began insisting that the root of the conflict is not 
1967 border but 1948 confrontation. This implicitly means that the Palestinians and the Arabs 
must recognize the state of Israel as homeland for the Jewish people if they want Israel to 
recognize Palestine as a land for the Palestinians.  
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Abstrak 
 
Artikel ini bertujuan untuk meneliti strategi Israel berkaitan isu perundingan dengan Palestin 
semasa pemerintahan kerajaan Netahayu 2009-2011. Kerajaan pakatan Netanyahu-Lieberman 
ditubuhkan selepas kekalahan kerajaan Kadiman sebelumnya yang diketuai oleh  Yahud  Olmert 
dalam pilihanraya tahun 2009. Kerajaan Netanyahu menggunakan pendekatan berperingkat yang 
memecahkan penyelesaian dengan Palestin kepada dua peringkat, iaitu penyelesaian interim dan 
penyelesaian kekal. Netanyahu menegaskan bahawa permulaan konflik bukan dalam tahun 1967 
tetapi konfrontasi tahun 1948. Tujuannya ialah untuk menghalang usaha Abbas-Fayyad untuk 
mengantarabangsakan konflik Israel-Palestin. Ini secara halus mesti menerima kewujudan Negara 
Israel sebagai tanah air orang Yahudi jika Palestin ingin Israel kewujudan Palestinc sebagai tanah 
air untuk orang Palestin.  
 
Kata kunci: Israel, Palestin, perundingan,  Netanyahu, Kadima 
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Introduction: 
 
Conflict resolution also overlaps with conflict management,where some experts believe that 
conflict management is the umbrella name for conflict resolution and conflict transformation. The 
conventional meaning of conflict management could be replaced with broader processes such as 
containment, settlement, resolution, transformation and prevention of conflicts. Conflict 
management is strongly rising as umbrella discipline dealing with conflict, its causes, symptoms, 
dynamics and solutions. Its and important field including description, understanding, prediction 
and participation in part or comprehensive, interim or permanent solutions (Azem Hamad : 
2005).  
 
In conflict resolution paradigm, it's possible to transcend conflicts if parties can be helped 
to explore, analyze, question and reframe their positions and interests. Conflict resolution 
therefore emphasizes intervention by skilled and powerless third parties working unofficially to 
foster new thinking and new relationships. In this respect, one can argue that conflict resolution is 
about how parties to conflict can move from zero sum pattern of conflict to positive sum 
constructive outcomes.  On the other hand conflict transformation theorists argue that it's 
important to engage the conflicting parties by transforming their interests, relationships and 
discourses. People within the conflict parties, within conflicting societies or communities, along 
with people at regional and international levels, all have designed roles to play in peace building 
(Miall, 2011). 
 
Te resolve conflicts substantially, it's necessary to address two fundamental problems 
concurrently: first, the effective control of violence between the two conflicting parties, and, 
second, the building of  cooperative relationships within the communities or within the societies 
to promote sustainable peace building in the long run (Hansen, 2004). 
     
The present Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu envisions the peace process 
with the Palestinians on the basis of actual balance of power between both conflicting parties and 
the real facts on the ground. It was inaugurated in the aftermath of some events including the war 
on Gaza launched by the previous Olmert government and after a serious of negotiation rounds 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis run by Olmert-Abbas themselves. The peace process 
was deadlocked since 2009, although one or two meetings were held between Abbas and 
Netanyahu under the US auspices but without fruitful or tangible results in actual terms.    
 
Interim Solution 
The starting point for the interim solutions to the Israeli Palestinian conflict is the common claim 
that there is no such solution! This paradoxical situation originates in equal but competing 
biblical as well as historical claims.  
To complicate matters further, there are issues regarding the fate of Palestinians refugees 
(following the establishment of the Israeli state in 1984 and the subsequent Six Day Arab-Israeli 
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war in 1967). The ever- growing number of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Areas, 
the Separation Wall, the fixing of road blocks preventing free Palestinian movements between 
own towns and villages as  wells as contradictory visions regarding the final status of Jerusalem, 
are all further difficulties to a peaceful settlement. 
In such an intricate situation, where common visions are absent, and ideologies are 
conflictive; an approach by strategic ideas drawn from the theory of conflict resolution is 
proposed (Ayland: 2010, 7-8). Proponents of the interim solution from the Israeli side as well as 
their Western supporters claim that where enabling condition to resolve the conflict are absent, 
negotiation should not be stopped. Israel should push for interim solutions with the Palestinians 
to save its own political and security interests. 
Interim solutions from the Israeli view-point involve either a partial withdrawal from 
Palestinian areas occupied after the six-day war and/or the establishment of a provisional 
Palestinian state on temporary borders as a negotiating option displayed in the road map for 
peace. According to the strategic expert and Chairman of the former National Security Council, 
General Giora Eiland; states that the interim solution serves four main benefits for Israel, these 
are: 
Firstly the interim solution reduces the political damage, which was caused to Israel by 
retaining the current situation. Secondly the establishment of a Palestinian state in temporary 
borders should reduce the area of the Israeli occupation making the majority of population (95%) 
Palestinians under own rule, thus reducing contact with the Israeli road blocks and barriers and 
settlements. 
Thirdly, this solution can solve all the practical issues (such as the border) but beyond 
resolving the core issues such as refugees, Jerusalem and settlements. 
Fourthly, the interim solution will also reduce tension between the two sides paving the 
way to a complete interim solution and turning it into a final one (Ayland:2010, 8-9). 
Eiland recognises also that the Palestinian side –especially the Palestinian president (Abu 
Mazen) objects to the idea of an interim solution due to their fear of turning such a solution into a 
lasting and permanent one. Meanwhile, the Israelis realise that interim solution have its own 
drawbacks and advantages as far as the Israeli security is concerned. The advantages of the 
interim solution to the Israelis is that it is easy to reach once an agreement between the two 
parties is forged, thus leaving the main conflicting issues ( such as the question of Jerusalem) to 
be dealt with at  the final negotiating table- a matter which Israel is extremely critical of. As far 
as the disadvantages; the Israelis see that an interim solution will shrink the file of political 
manoeuvring with the Palestinian side; Israeli withdrawal from certain Palestinian areas will 
reduce the Israeli advantages of holding the bargaining chips. Another disadvantage is that if the 
interim solution fails its implementation phase, trust will be damaged between the two sides and 
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expectations are reduced leading to an aggravated security situations especially for Israel (Even: 
2008). 
Netanyahu’s position is consistent with his Minister of State Lieberman; they believe that 
interim solutions are options for the best negotiating strategy with the Palestinians. Netanyahu 
wants to manage the conflict with the Palestinians during the negotiations for the sake of 
negotiations and not to reach a final solution. Netanyahu spoke on condition that the Palestinian 
recognition of the Jewishness of the state of Israel and the Jewish people ultimate rights over the 
entire land are preconditions for negotiations. These are in essence aimed at the inclusion of new 
topics for negotiations just to complicate any suggested final solution to the conflict in the future. 
Unilateral Direction without Agreement 
The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was one of the most important unilateral Israeli experiences, 
which, although led to undesirable results, it did serve some valuable lessons for the Israeli 
strategic mission. In spite of the smuggling of arms through the Philadelphi route and lack of 
coordination arrangements for boarder crossing, Israel managed to relieve itself of the burden of 
Gaza and the costly military rule of some one million and three hundred thousand rebellious 
Gazans. And so after the inter-Palestinian conflict and the forceful military takeover of Gaza by 
Hamas, the security situation for Israel improved and the Gaza-Israeli boarder became the 
quietest in its entire history. 
And so the lessons learned from the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and by 
exercising extra caution, such lessons can be repeated elsewhere. Thus any unilateral move on 
behalf of Israel will have to take into account not evacuating the areas but also making sure that 
they are left secure. One final lesson learnt is that any unilateral withdrawal should not necessary 
lead to a total evacuation from any region though the withdrawal from the West Bank could not 
possibly be from the entire area but parts of it. 
Israeli talks of repeating the same experience in the West Bank and by retaining certain 
parts under own control such as the Israeli settlement blocks and all areas behind the Separation 
Wall as well as Valley of the Great (the Jordan Valley) should lead the Palestinians to manage 
own affairs. However, the situation that prevailed afterwards although boosted reasonable 
opportunities to reach an agreement on acceptable grounds, this did not happen due to loss of 
hope and disperse on reaching a final settlement. 
With the increased crisis for negotiations and the strenuous search for exit solution for the 
Israeli dilemmatic  situation  due to demands for Israel to freeze its settlement activities and thus 
submit to the Palestinian precondition for the resumption of the negotiation process. In view of 
the demands posed by the international community for the submission to the Palestinian 
conditions, it appears there is an Israeli need to search for unilateral exit, which may succeed in 
offering new options on the ground. Such an option which may satisfy the Palestinian minimum 
demands and provides Israel with its maximum security interests. 
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The Israeli publicity media spoke of the unilateral and voluntary withdrawal security plan, 
which began to appear in the Likud lobby halls and which may turn into a policy vision and a 
political offer. This offering is in fact a repeat of reproduction of previously offered plans by 
Olmert and Sharon. The current Israeli serious discussions which centre around reviving the older 
plans by Sharon in 2005, which is specific in its voluntary withdrawal and unilateral approach, 
and which Sharon has implemented its initial phase by withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and 
some isolated areas in the north of the West Bank. 
Olmert intentions to implement voluntary withdrawal and the often referred to by himself 
as the re-allocation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank to new seven settlement 
concentrations in the West Bank. These seven settlement concentrations which are planned to be 
annexed to Israel and by the removal of Palestinian populated areas outside of it where frozen. 
This was due to the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006, when he declared that such a move was not a 
priority. Olmert plan included also the completion of the Separation Wall and the withdrawal 
from the Palestinian towns and villages and the removal of the isolated Israeli settlement posts 
from the heart of the Palestinian populated areas.  
Olmert security plan included also the transfer of nearly 40-70 thousand Israeli settlers to 
the new allocated settlements concentration and the prevention of the Palestinians from taking 
over the vacated areas whilst retaining it under the control of the Israeli army. By implementing 
this plan Olmert aimed at the total removal of Israeli settlers living outside the separation Wall 
into geographically connected areas with the “motherland of Israel” and becomes part of it. 
However, in 2008, Olmert appeared on Israeli National TV to state that the choice for unilateral 
solution remains an option should the bilateral negotiations fails to find a durable solution for the 
Israeli Palestinian conflict.  
According to the new developed plan in 2010, Israel re-allocates the settlement behind the 
Separation Wall and their transfer to within the concentrated settlements inside the West Bank. 
At the same time, while Israel withdraws from the Palestinian populated areas without 
abandoning its security obligations and maintaining safe passages which enable Israel to work 
freely according to its security needs. Israel learned from their experience of unilateral 
disengagement from the Gaza Strip and parts of the North of the West Bank. In other words, 
Israeli civil presence in the West Bank can be dismantled from the main Palestinian areas. Thus, 
the Israeli army and its intelligent service maintain, a constant presence and acceptable 
monitoring on the ground to satisfy the Israeli needs and security guarantees. In the words of 
Ma’areev newspaper; the exit from the Palestinian veins in all that is relevant to civil 
administration and control, should make Israeli a favourable state in the eyes of the International 
community, at least for some time (Maarev, 2010). 
Amongst the Likud party lobby halls, a current discussion of developing the voluntary 
withdrawal plans while taking into account the main ideas from the older Olmert plan include the 
following main issues: 
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Firstly, the plan of course does not mean full withdrawal of the entire West Bank Area; 
the Israel withdrawal plan under the Likud party, begins with initiatives and steps on the ground, 
which include the withdrawal from the main populated Palestinian areas.  Secondly, while 
keeping control over the major settlement blocks in the Occupied Palestinian Areas, the plan 
includes also the retaining of strong security presence on strategic heights westwards as well as 
eastwards. 
 
Thirdly, the plan maintains control over strategic locations in the Palestinian areas of the 
West Bank while keeping control over the main natural water resources. 
 
Fourthly, Israel keeps total security control over the Jordan valley and the Dead Sea. 
The intention of the discussion of the unilateral solution comes in the context of Israeli 
efforts to impose conditions for solutions on the Palestinian leadership from the perspective of 
forceful acceptance with no other choices or the exertion of pressure on the Palestinian leadership 
to prevent them from any future unilateral steps. This provides the Israeli leadership with a 
window of opportunity to prevent the Palestinians from approaching the United Nations for full 
recognition of the Palestinian State as an independent state within the 1967 borders in Sep. 2011. 
Meanwhile, internal Israeli discussions began around their own response on any 
Palestinian unilateral declaration of an independent Palestinian state or any attempts by the 
international community to recognise a Palestinian state as an independent political entity within 
the 1967 boarders. As far as Israel is concerned, its response to the unilateral Palestinian 
declaration would be met with an Israeli unilateral reaction through the imposition of a consensus 
agreement, which meets the Israeli security needs and their strategic interests.  
The Israeli strategic plans included also the unilateral withdrawal from wide areas in the 
West Banks while maintaining security control over owns settlement blocks and all routes as well 
as by-pass routes leading to them. This vision enables Israel in the case of any military 
confrontation with the Palestinians to re-occupy main cities of the West Bank and tearing a part 
all geographical locations in the Palestinian Territories. Should such a situation arise, it will 
eventually force the Palestinian newly established state to surrender to the Israeli negotiation 
demands to administer the security arrangements on the ground. This means, that the Palestinian 
state would be one with temporary boarders with a geographically disconnected nature. This 
short-term solutions may turn into a long-term obligations. 
Long-Term Solution-Permanent Agreement 
Proponents of the final solution amongst the Israeli side claim that such a solution is the right 
formula, which both Israeli and Palestinian sides can eventually agree upon it. Therefore, there is 
not other choice except pressing with it in totality and at once. The pro-permanent solution add 
that time is against Israel and the continuing of the status-quo or any incremental or stage-wise 
solutions would shrink the political manoeuvring ground for the Israeli side in the future. This 
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will also weaken the Israeli pre-conditions for negotiations; therefore Israel should exploit its 
military and political advantages to determine the shape and nature of the final solution and puts 
an end to the conflict at once (Ayland: 2010, 10). 
The Israelis are not the only side in the negotiation process because the Palestinian side in 
general and the Palestinian president- Mahmood Abbas in particular are persistent in their calls 
for negotiations for a final solution and not any incremental or stage-wise solutions. This issue 
forms one of the main points for differences between both Netanyahu and Mahmood Abbas 
(Laibi: 2010, 70). 
The Israeli strategic expert and ex-army General Efraim Laibi points out that the Palestinian 
President Abu-Mazin prefers going for negotiations for a final solution tackling all obstinate 
issues. Abu Mazin is insistent of a final solution settlement comes in view of the presence of the 
right wing Israeli government led by Netanyahu- Lieberman.  
Abu-mazin pushes for final settlement solution originates from within his believe that the 
current Israeli government objects to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the 
whole territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile. Laibi believes that the 
Palestinian Authority demanded from Israel the freezing of the Israeli settlements in the 
Palestinian areas, not only in harmony with the American position but also because the 
Palestinian Authority wants to push for negotiations without changing the current status quo on 
the ground and because the Palestinian Authority fulfilled its road map obligations whiles Israel 
maintained its settlement activities in the West Bank.  
Laibi believes also that the Palestinians will implement their plans to achieve a world-
wide recognition of a Palestinian State should Netanyahu insists on his pre-conditions for 
negotiations. This should also provide the Palestinians with the opportunity to implement Salam 
Fayyad vision for establishing a Palestinian State outside of the negotiation theatre with the 
Israelis (Laibi: 2010, 71). For this reason, the international community rejected the economic 
peace as offered by Netanyahu as an alternative to the political peace so to speak. This is because 
economic peace implies transitory or temporary peace and not long-term or permanent peace. In 
the meanwhile, Netanyahu welcomed the Palestinian domestic policies which have been 
implemented by the PA to establish the Palestinian State and re-building of the State institutions 
(Feldman: 2009). 
In spite of the corrosion for Israeli support of permanent solution, and the rise of other 
strategic ideas in favour of temporary and short-term solutions, the idea of long-term and 
permanent solution remains a favourable option attracting some support from the main Israeli 
political parties including the Labour, Kadema and some other members within the Likud main 
stream. This is the case although the postponing of the more important and complicated issues 
such as the question of Jerusalem, the removal of settlements and return of the Palestinian 
refugees as well as an agreed final shape of the boarders, are all persistent excuses to by-pass the 
Palestinian demands in favour of the least damage to the Israeli interests.   
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The permanent solution from the Israeli perspective means reaching an agreement with 
the Palestinian side, which involves settling all the intractable issues. The Israeli offer intends to 
place the Palestinians in a position where they lower their demands while agreeing to the ultimate 
and historical solutions putting a final end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
Advantages of reaching a final solution from the view point of its proponents in the Israeli 
side include the following main points:    
1. There is a genuine desire on behalf of major world powers and especially Israeli 
allies and friends to end the chronic conflict in the Middle East. The search for 
permanent solution was the main feature of most peace efforts and proposals, 
which were proposed by various world-powers to stop the conflict and reduce 
tension in the region. 
 
2. The Israeli future is linked with its ability to be a normal part of its surroundings. 
This of course will not be achieved unless a historical settlement is reached to 
settle all differences and disputes with its neighbours. The permanent solution 
should also enable Israel to normalise relations with its neighbours and allows for 
a full political and economic integrations. 
 
3. The final solutions provides the Palestinians with an independent state and fulfil 
their desire to exercise their own sovereignty on own land, while enabling them to 
share parts of Jerusalem and find an acceptable solution to the Palestinian 
refugees. All of this should heal the past bloody memories in the area and end their 
demand which causes most of the crisis in the region. 
 
4. Any postponement of the permanent solution and the search for non- permanent 
alternatives will contribute to the complexity of the situation and will develop new 
ones which do not help in solving the crisis and may turn these efforts into time-
bombs and death traps, which Israel should deal with in the future. And because 
the future is not guaranteed and always uncertain, due to international relations 
may differ as much as the possibilities of changing regional balance of power, 
therefore, it is for the Israeli best interest to search for a final and permanent 
solution, no matter how costly. 
 
5. The continuation of hostilities and conflict will be too costly for Israel, and may 
cause excessive deterioration of its international relations with the outside world 
including its main allies and friends. Opinion polls in Western Europe and the US 
indicate a deteriorating public image for Israel. There also appears to be indicators 
which points to increased campaigns for the de-legitimising of Israel as a Jewish 
state in international organization and human rights groups. 
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Therefore, ending of the conflict means that Israel will be enabled to rid itself of all 
burdens associated with its own creation following the 1948 Arab-Israel war. This should also 
provide Israel with a legitimacy to be part of a greater and peacefully settled region. Should not 
this vision be achieved, Israel will be met with greater strategic challenges and dangerous threats 
to its existence.  From the strategic perspective, only a permanent and agreed upon solution may 
bring to Israel international guarantees to its security and any a possible undermine of its 
legitimacy. 
Rhetoric of Recognition: from the Periphery to the Centre 
During his new term as a prime minister, Netanyahu demanded that the Palestinians recognise the 
Jewishness of the Israeli state as a basic and preliminary condition to reach a final solution with 
them. And before discussing the issue of recognition in greater details, it should be stated that the 
subject of recognition as an obstacle to peaceful settlement between the two sides is not new in 
the Israeli discussion arena. There was an academic Israeli debates which focused on the 
psychological barriers and the conflicting, and contradicting historical claims on both sides. 
Added to the intellectual and ethical differences along with the concept of justice which differs 
on both sides. All of these differing views were exploited as barriers by the Israelis to prevent 
settlement and compromise. Except Netanyahu managed to transfer this debate strongly into the 
political arena; instead of adopting a settlement approach, he used terms of reconciliation, not 
because he intended to apply it, rather, he knew the difficulties reconciliation will be faced with 
on both sides as well as his confidence that such a tactic will remove any possibilities of a 
solution and will ultimately fail the negotiations (Bar Seman Tov: 2010). 
Netanyahu backed-off from proceeding on the same basis of negotiations such that which 
was used by the predecessor Israeli governments. Such basis which began from the view point of 
reaching an agreement regarding boundaries first and which also the Palestinian side agreed to. 
Netanyahu, however, wanted to place a new foundation for fresh negotiation, which begins with 
talks on security arrangements and the recognition of the state of Israel as a Jewish state and not 
on the demarcation of boundaries; a clear implication of the Jewishness of the state of Israel! 
This new approach by the Netanyahu government constitutes a fresh arrangements for the 
Israeli negotiations priorities in addition to the recognition of the Jewishness of the Hebrew state; 
a radical new tactic (Tal- Landman: 2010, 121-35). Netanyahu understood that the symbolic 
recognition of the Jewishness of the state of Israel implies historical evidence which ties the 
proclaimed Jewish historical rights with Palestine. This of course would also be a compensation 
token for the right wing political parties in exchange for their support and agreement to divide the 
“the Land of Israel”. The demand for the recognition of Israel as Jewish state was repeated by 
Netanyahu at his Bar-Illan university rhetoric speech in June 2009 and was re-affirmed in front of 
Council of Foreign Affairs in New York in July 2010. 
Netanyahu fresh approach is considered not only a new one but also a deep pre-condition 
demand as it ties between the success of the negotiations with the issue of the recognition of 
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Israel as a Jewish state.. Netanyahu also believed that through the Palestinian’s recognition of the 
Jewishness of Israel would resolve all major differences between the Palestinians and the Israelis.  
In his own words, and before his meeting with President Abbas in Sharm-El-Shaik in 
Egypt, Netanyahu stated that “the main obstacle to peace in the Middle East is the issue of 
recognition. He also added that “when we manage to overcome our mutual recognition, I hope we 
can –after one year- to congratulate each other with blessing and peace". In many other 
occasions, Netanyahu described the Palestinian refusal to the issue of recognition as the roots to 
the conflict.  
After the launching of negotiations with the Palestinians in Washington, Netanyahu went 
straight to the negotiations after the celebration of the Jewish New Year saying; “ we insist that 
the final settlement with the Palestinian must be based on two main principles; security and 
recognition. Security; because peace will not stand unless new security arrangement are placed 
on the ground. As for recognition of Israel as a nation state for the Jewish people because the 
Palestinians are asking us for the recognition of a Palestinian national state!” (PMO 
Communication Spokesman: 2010). 
The Netanyahu recognition speech takes back the debate to the core of the conflict; the 
1948 year when the state of Israel was founded and not the 1967 six day war. This move is 
brought into light because Netanyahu believes that the de-legitimisation of Israel, which has 
become an intense issue in recent years, is rooted in the Palestinian refusal to recognise Israel as a 
Jewish state. In a further statement in December 2010- after the failure to resume Israel-
Palestinian talks, Netanyahu stated “even if we manage to reach peace agreement, our legitimacy 
will remain exposed; this is because it is not rooted in the events of 1967 war, rather in the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war because there was an Arab efforts to prevent the Jews from having a national 
state and national home (Haartez: 2010, 12). 
Netanyahu repeated his demands for recognition rhetoric in every possible occasion while 
attempting to follow on with this strategy re-affirming his position in three occasions in May 
2011. He further affirmed his position during the AIPAC (American Israeli Public Affairs 
Committee) meetings and his well-known speech in front of the US Congress also in June 2011. 
In alls his speeches, Netanyahu made it clear that the problem does not lie in the 
establishment of a Palestinian state but in the Palestinian refusal to the recognition of  Israel as 
Hewish state.. The purpose of re-asserting this position is an effort on behalf of the Netanyahu 
government to remove the public position Israel is being held into as an occupier state. This 
became clear when Netanyahu himself stated during his speech at the American Congress that the 
Israelis presence in the West Bank is NOT an occupation, rather, a return to the Land of the 
Ancestors. By tying the Jewish people with the West Bank through historical and religious right, 
Netanyahu is prepared to drop-off painfully such rights in exchange for the Palestinians’ 
recognition for state of Israel as Jewish sate.. 
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Netanyahu's Vision of Interim Solutions 
As far as his own preference is concerned, Netanyahu sees that the interim solutions are best to 
service his negotiations strategy with the Palestinians. In adopting this position; Netanyahu finds 
himself in alliance with his Foreign Minister Lieberman on the subject. The former wants to 
manage the Palestinian- Israeli conflict through prolonged negotiations for the sake of continuing 
negotiations and not to reach a final solution!   Should the Palestinians recognise Israel as Jewish 
state and submit to the rights of the Jewish people over the land, is in essence a precondition for 
further negotiating issues and new subjects which will complicate matters further and prevent the 
reaching of a final settlement. Consider for instance a precondition such as the removal of both 
the Jerusalem and refugees issues from the negotiation agenda; a situation will not be and cannot 
be accepted by the Palestinian side. 
As far as Netanyahu is concerned this is a suitable exit even for the Palestinians: the 
Palestinians will get their recognised state at the end and at the same time, any unforeseen 
dangers and security concerns as far as the Israelis are concerned will be minimised. This is due 
to the main objective of the plan, which focuses on the security side of the negotiations, will 
allow Israel to exercise control over the eastern boundaries of the Palestinian State (the Jordan 
Valley) as well as the Western boundaries (the Security or Separation Wall), in addition to their 
control over the water resources and sovereignty over Jerusalem. In more accurate words, the 
Israeli vision will render the Palestinian State well-surrounded by Israel from all directions as 
well as being geographically discontinued (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) unless the Israelis 
permit so. 
According to a reliable Palestinian source; in previous meeting at Sharm El-Sheik, 
Washington, and in Jerusalem, Netanyahu offered an interim and gradual solution, which may 
take up-to more than ten years whereby Israel maintains 40% of the West Bank. This would keep 
the Israeli concentrated settlements in place and keeping control over Jerusalem as well as 
holding a full lease over the Jordan Valley for further 40 years and the maintaining of military 
posts at the main entrances of all Palestinian major cities. This proves that Netanyahu is held 
firmly in the belief that interim and stage-wise solutions are the best offer he can give in 
replacement of a final solution. 
What matter most to Netanyahu is that the Eastern border of the proposed Palestinian 
state remains in the Israeli hands and any other borders should temporarily remain! This of course 
would enable Israel from examining the extent to which this arrangement suits Israeli security 
needs and if any further modifications are needed. The Security Wall would remain the Western 
boundaries for the Palestinian state and whatever lays westwards remains as Israeli while the 
Eastern boundary of the Wall is Palestine (Al-Ayyam Newspaper: 2010). According to this 
proposition; there is a major difference between the security boundaries and the political 
boundaries. Thus the Palestinian state can claim its political boundaries to stretch up to the Jordan 
Valley where as its security boarders would not! This proposition resembles the Oslo Accord in 
its essence as far as the administrative and the military sovereignty; the autonomy of the state is 
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of a political and administrative nature, which covers the inhabitants of the Jordan Valley 
whereas Israel retains absolute political and administrative autonomy.   
The Israeli experience gained from leaving Gaza proved that Israel should hold onto 
something; Israel cannot possibly leave totally military-free zones from the areas which were 
once under its military control or of no further military interest. Thus the complete exit from the 
Philadelphia crossing for instance proved to be a mistake which should not be repeated; arm 
smuggling bloomed in the absence of an Israeli presence and this has threatened the Israeli 
security interest, and so how is it possible to withdraw from a boundary that is some 80 km in 
length? 
 
Current discussion is taking place around a framework of permanent settlement (or a 
framework agreement) which includes guarantees obligating both side to commit to the spirit of a 
final solution premised on the principle of two-states for two peoples, however with changes and 
arrangements which guarantee taking the Israeli demands into consideration. This guarantee 
although is committed to the general framework for the settlement as the title suggests however 
does not consider taking into account too much considerations the finer details. This proposed 
agreement may stretch up to thirty years (Netanyahu expressed definitely for more than twenty 
years), whereby Palestinians undergo the “Monitored Test”. Whilst announcing the agreement; 
the Palestinians officially announce their independent state while the Israelis presence does not 
diminish with the signing of this agreement. The Israelis withdraw their military presence 
gradually and n incremental basis, meanwhile, the Israeli presence in the Jordan valley remains 
according to private arrangements as mentioned previously. 
 
The Israeli offers of incremental solution hide dangers; gradual solutions may turn into 
final solutions and therefore dealing with it should take this matter into serious considerations. 
Migrating the Israeli crisis this way may eventually placing it onto the shelves and thus ignoring 
it; whatever is not on the discussion table today does not necessarily mean it will be debated 
another day; this is because there are real developments on the ground which may engage all 
party and becomes more important issue to be dealt with. 
 
Discussion and Summary 
 
Three main principles underpin the Israeli negotiations strategy adopted by the Israeli Prime 
Minister Netanyahu, these are: 
 
The Policy of Recognition:  
 
These policies form the initial indicators for the Israeli negotiation strategy. This is represented 
by the Israeli demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a state for the Jewish people, in 
other words Israel as Jewish state. Netanyahu raised the sealing for these policies by placing this 
demand as one of the main priorities at the top of the requirements for negotiations and placed it 
also as of value as those conditions attached to the final solution conditions. The policies of 
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recognitions aim at placing the claim that the main problem with the Palestinian side is not due to 
the Six Day War, rather, in the recognition of 1948 Arab-Israeli war. This implies simply the 
removal of the Israeli position being seen as an occupier to a question of recognition for the rights 
of the Israeli people. Referring back to the 1948 war is an Israeli effort to place the Jewish people 
as victims and thus the Jewishness of the state is being victimized. Whilst concentrating upon the 
1967 war places the problem in a question of occupation; a situation which Netanyahu does not 
want, because he knows the negotiations with the Palestinians cannot proceed any further to 
reach a final solution which may satisfies the position of the quartet, thus he wants to make the 
case a matter of recognition rather than a case of occupation. 
 
Dispersing the boundaries between incremental solutions and a final solution: 
 
In his speech at Bar-Élan University in 2009, Netanyahu spoke of his vision regarding the final 
solution with the Palestinians and expressing his approval to the two-state solution, although we 
believe that this celebration were artificial in Israel; Sharon did recognize the Palestinian state 
previous to Netanyahu though the former represented the right wing government more than the 
later did not to mention that Sharon held Kadima party as an expression of a shift in attitude 
towards the conflict with the Palestinians. This was evidently represented in the unilateral steps 
adopted by Sharon and by his vision of the Palestinian state as a demilitarized one. As Netanyahu 
expressed; this situation is acceptable by the American administration (Shalom: 2009); a state of 
partial sovereignty in its fly zone. By signing military and security agreement, it would leave the 
boarders of the Palestinian state in the hands of the Israelis especially the Jordan Valley, in 
addition to maintaining sovereignty over the concentrated settlements blocks as well as keeping 
Jerusalem unified. What Netanyahu referred to in this political framework as a state cannot be in 
any recognized political sense. Though offered previously as a preamble for a final solution, 
Netanyahu offered this political framework as a final solution, within which the Palestinians are 
required to declare an end to hostilities. 
 
Conflict Management: Netanyahu realizes the political and ideological obstacles facing a 
final solution. The right wing, which Netanyahu represent sees a final solution as a concession 
over the “Land of Israel” thus evacuating the settlements means a collapse of the Netanyahu 
government as well as a collapse of himself as a prime minister. Therefore Netanyahu looms the 
policies of recognition as new instruments to manage the conflict rather than resolve it; 
Netanyahu sees the negotiations as objectives by own right since he always declared that Israel 
was ready for negotiations and so when the American requested that Israel freezes settlements for 
three more months, he (Netanyahu) asked the Palestinians for recognition in exchange….a 
temporarily freeze (not mounting to a dismantle of settlements) in exchange of a permanent and 
historical recognition! Thus Netanyahu attempts to manage the conflict, not only with the 
Palestinians, but also in front of his own coalition camp (for instant, through government support 
for the referendum law). Netanyahu realizes only too well that the Palestinians will not accept the 
freezing of settlements in exchange of a Palestinian recognition for the Jewishness of Israeli and 
he knows if they do accept for argument sake, this would be a historical achievement at least in 
front of his own camp.. In reality, Netanyahu cannot go too far with the negotiations; consider the 
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security bargain offered to Israel by the USA in exchange of freezing the settlement for three 
months was rejected because Netanyahu prefers managing the conflict through one crisis into 
another and so on. Netanyahu however, is managing the conflict without any political horizon 
and without knowing where he wants to reach through such management. Netanyahu believes 
that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be resolved and this is what he confessed to Haarts 
Newspaper lately when he stated; “The conflict cannot resolved because it is not held on the 
ground” (Haartez: 2011). This statement sparked uproar in Israel as it reveals that Netanyahu is 
held in the belief that such conflict is unsolvable, so he is prolonging in the demand for the 
recognition of the Jewishness of the state of Israel, which runs in favour of managing the conflict 
and not solving it. 
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